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STATUTORY AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO
THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT
INFORMATION*
by
Constance Y Singleton** and Howard 0. Hunter***
INTRODUCTION
The tremendous growth of government occasioned by greater in-
volvement in the social and economic life of the nation has been the
cause of many concerns. Two perennial concerns have been the
extent to which the government can prevent public access to infor-
mation on the basis of which policies and decisions are made and
the possibility for misuse by the government of information private
to individuals or business firms. This article focuses on federal sta-
tutory responses to these issues.' The legislative intent has usually
been praiseworthy but the resulting statutes, especially as they have
been interpreted by the courts, have often been mutually inconsist-
ent, even to the point of being ironic.
This article also briefly considers the recent case of Houchins v.
KQED, Inc.,I in which the Court, by a narrow margin, rejected the
argument that the first and fourteenth amendments mandate at
least some access to information within the control of the govern-
ment. The decision in Houchins and similar cases make the statu-
tory responses to problems of access especially important.
In a democratic society there is a strong argument in favor of
general public access to the facts on which policy decisions are
based unless there is some compelling reason for confidentiality.
But public access obviously can create problems of individual pri-
* Copyright (c) 1978-Constance Y. Singleton and Howard 0. Hunter. The research for
portions of this article was supported, in part, by a grant from the Georgia Press Association
and the Associated Press of Georgia. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors
and are not intended to reflect the opinions of any other person, association or institution.
** B.A. 1969, University of Texas, Member of the Class of 1979, Emory University School
of Law.
*** B.A. 1968, J.D. 1971, Yale University, Assistant Professor of Law, Emory University
School of Law.
1. Various states have also dealt with similar issues by the enactment of "sunshine laws"
and various statutes to protect individual privacy. The diversity of state laws and state cases
is, however, too much to cover in an article of this length. Thus, consideration will be limited
to the federal experience.
2. - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
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vacy if the government collects (as it does) masses of data on its
citizens. The conflict between two desirable goals, public access and
individual privacy, has set the stage for the consideration of some
ticklish problems.
I. THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT-HISTORY AND APPLICATION
Thirty-two years ago Congress first attempted to require federal
agencies to disclose their activities and actions to the public by the
enactment of an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act.'
The 1946 law proved to be generally unsatisfactory, because it gave
such broad discretion to each agency that information could be
withheld almost at will.4 There was no remedy for a person who was
denied access to requested information.'
The shortcomings of the 1946 Act concerned a number of Con-
gressmen and hearings on possible amendments began in 1955,1 but
it was another eleven years before any substantive action was taken.
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)7 became law in 1966.8 The
3. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324 § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946) (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976)).
4. See Proposed Amendments to the Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 1160
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1965).
5. The net effect was that there was virtually no disclosure of significant information. See
generally H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2418, 2422 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP. 1497 with page citations to [1966] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS].
6. These hearings were the result of recommendations by the Hoover Commission Task
Force. The first proposals for major revisions were introduced contemporaneously by Repre-
sentative Moss (H.R. 7174) and Senator Hennings (S. 2148). See H.R. REP. 1497 at 2420-21.
The Moss-Hennings bill would have stipulated that the authority of department heads to
regulate storage and use of government records did not allow them to withhold those records
from the public. Id. at 2419.
7. PUB. L. No. 89-487, as amended by PUB. L. No. 90-23 and PUB. L. No. 93-502, 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976). For legislative history, see [1967] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1196; [1974]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6267; [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2183.
8. A Freedom of Information bill, S. 1666, was passed July 31, 1964, by the Senate without
a dissenting vote, 110 CONG. REc. 17668, but the House did not consider the bill before the
88th Congress adjourned. During the next session, a virtually identical bill was introduced
in the House, and after considerable debate on both sides of the Capitol, the law was passed
in 1966 to become effective July 4, 1967. The executive branch consistently opposed any
revisions to the 1964 law. On record es opposing the House bill were the Departments of
Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, HEW, Interior, Labor, State and Treasury, plus the Post
Office, AEC, NASA, NLRB, ICC, CAB, FAA, FCC and SSS. 111 CONG. REC. at 27839-40.
The Justice Department submitted a proposal of its own in June, 1965. It provided that any
information could be withheld "by direction of the President" and it omitted any means of
legal redress for one who was denied access. Id. at 27839-41. On the other side, support for
the legislation came from such disparate groups as the ACLU, ABA, American Trial Lawyers'
Association, Chamber of Commerce, AFL-CIO, National Press Photographers' Association
and the American Newspaper Publishers' Association.
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legislative history, the language of the FOIA itself and the cases
which have arisen under it have all emphasized that the FOIA es-
tablishes disclosure as the rule and nondisclosure as the exception.
All agency opinions, orders, and rules generally must be made avail-
able for public inspection and copying." An order that is not properly
indexed and made available to the public may not even be relied
upon or cited as precedent by an agency. 0
Nevertheless, the FOIA does list nine categories of information
which may be exempted from mandatory disclosure requirements."
The Act does not require that information in one or more of the
exempt categories be kept confidential; rather, it simply leaves the
question of disclosure to the discretion of the agency. 2 In addition,
9. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976). Dissenting and concurring opinions must also be included.
10. The Senate bill (S. 1160) would have allowed the agency to withhold an advisory
interpretation until it was cited or relied upon "by an officer or employee of the agency as a
precedent in the disposition of other cases." H.R. REP. 1497 at 2424.
11. The nine exceptions are:
(1) Material subject to an executive order of secrecy for reasons of national security
or foreign policy; provided that such material is properly classified pursuant to such
order.
(2) Information related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency.
(3) Matters specifically exempted from disclosure by another statute.
(4) Trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person
and privileged or confidential.
(5) Inter-agency or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be available
by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency.
(6) Personnel files, medical files and similar files, the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.
(7) Investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the
extent that the production of such records would:
(a) interfere with enforcement proceedings;
(b) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication;
(c) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(d) disclose the identity of a confidential source and, in certain limited
instances, of a criminal or national security investigation, confidential infor-
mation furnished by a confidential source;
(e) disclose investigative techniques and procedure; or
(f) endanger the life or physical safety of law enforcement personnel.
(8) Information contained in or related to examination, operating or condition
reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the
regulation or supervision of financial institutions.
(9) Geological or geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells.
5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9) (1976).
12. As Professor Davis has noted:
The Act contains no provision forbidding disclosure. It requires disclosure of all
records except what is "specifically" within the nine exemptions and other provi-
sions. The exemptions protect against required disclosure, not against disclosure.
19791
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a 1974 amendment provided that the listed exemptions do not es-
tablish a basis for withholding information from Congress.' Al-
though the Act may allow the disclosure of information within the
exempted categories, there has been a general bureaucratic reluct-
ance to do so without some external prodding, usually in the form
of litigation.
Any person, including corporations, partnerships and other asso-
ciations as well as individuals, may request "identifiable records"
from an agency in accordance with procedures estalhihPd and pub-
lished by that agency." If access is denied for any reason, the re-
questing party may bring suit in the United States District Court
where he resides or has his principal place of business or in the
district where the records are located. 5 The court has jurisdiction
to order the agency to show that the records need not be produced. "
In the event of noncompliance with a court order of disclosure, the
responsible agency employee may be held in contempt. 7 In order to
expedite such cases, the statute specifically provides that an FOIA
suit will be given precedence on the calendar."
There has been some controversy about who may be sued, and
what sorts of documents or data may be requested aside from those
which come within specifically exempted categories. For instance,
in CIBA-Geigy Corp. v. Matthews," the plaintiff sought to obtain
records of the University Group Diabetes Program (UGDP), a feder-
ally funded private research group. The Food and Drug Administra-
tion was using the results of UGDP research to support a rule requir-
ing warning labels on oral hypoglycemic drugs. The suit failed be-
cause the court decided that UGDP was not an "agency" subject to
the FOIA because it had no authority to make governmental deci-
sions and it was not subject to operational control by the federal
government. Individual government officials, such as the Attorney
General and the Director of the FBI, are subject to the FOIA and
The Act leaves officers free to disclose or withhold records covered by the exemp-
tions . ..
Davis, The Information Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CI. L. REv. 761, 766 (1967). See
also Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 555 F.2d 82 (3d
Cir. 1977); Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc. v. ITO Corp., 508 F.2d 945, 950 (4th Cir. 1974).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(c) (1976).
14. Id. § 552(a)(3).
15. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 552(a)(4)(G).
18. Id. § 552(a)(4)(D).
19. 428 F. Supp. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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are treated as if they were agencies themselves. 211 It is also no excuse
that disclosure might be burdensome,' although a request for large
quantities of data may necessitate some delays to avoid unnecessary
disruptions. The impact of the Act is specifically on subdivisions of
the Executive Department and their employees. A person or an
institution which contracts to perform services for the government
does not thereby become subject to all the requirements of the
FOIA.2 2 That should be comforting to government contractors, such
as universities, which are already subject to a plethora of regula-
tions.23
Generally, the courts have been permissive in deciding who is
entitled to seek information, and usually the identity of the persons
for whom the records are sought need not be revealed to the
agency.24 Newsmen, for example, have been plaintiffs in several
cases. 5 The identity of the person seeking disclosure may be impor-
tant, however, in determining whether there might be an unreasona-
ble invasion of privacy, which could bring into play one of the ex-
emptions.2 1 In Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America 7 the court ruled
that documents in an FBI investigatory file were not exempt from
disclosure2 because the investigation was not related to a law en-
forcement proceeding that was conducted for "intelligence pur-
poses" and the file had long been closed. The complainant in that
case was the subject of the investigation. It is certainly arguable
20. Hamlin v. Kelly, 433 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. I11. 1977).
21. Id. Sometimes, the requesting party will be called upon to pay the costs of copying
and production. See Burke v. United States Department of Justice, 559 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.
1977). The FOIA does not provide an additional discovery device. If a litigant is not entitled
to discovery of certain information, he is not entitled to obtain it through an FOIA suit.
United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 552(e)(1976). See S. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6285, 6293.
23. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232g-1232i (1976). (The Family Education Rights and Privacy
Act of 1974); 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976) (Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972);
29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976) (Rehabilitation Act of 1973); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d(4) (1970) (Title
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); 45 C.F.R. §§ 80.6-.10, Part 81, §§ 84.61, 86.71 (1977). See
generally H. ORLEANS, THE EFFEcTs OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON HIGHER EDUCATION (1962); B.
SMITH & J. KARLESKY, THE UNIVERSITIES IN THE NATION'S RESEARCH EFFORT (1977); Kidd, The
Implications of Research Funds for Academic Freedom, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 613 (1963);
Kirk, Massive Subsidies and Academic Freedom, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 607 (1963).
24. Benson v. GSA, 289 F. Supp. 590 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff'd, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1969).
25. See, e.g., Nixon v. Sampson, 389 F. Supp. 107 (D.D.C. 1975); Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. HUD, 343 F. Supp. 1176 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
26. See note 11 supra.
27. 371 F. Supp. 97 (D.D.C. 1974).
28. The FBI relied on the seventh category of exemptions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7).
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that a different result might have been reached had the party seek-
ing disclosure been someone other than the subject of the FBI inves-
tigation. At least there might have been a balancing between the
interest of the subject in maintaining as private the fact of the
investigation itself-regardless of what it uncovered-and the inter-
est of the public in learning of the investigation. This is essentially
the same dilemma which is regularly considered in balancing
"newsworthiness" against privacy. 9 There may be a great public
interest in knowing that the FBI investigated Martin Luther King,
Jr. There may be considerably less interest in knowing that ten
years ago the FBI undertook an investigation of John Doe which
resulted in no further action. A problem such as this one clearly
exemplifies the difficulties that can result from a disclosure statute.
However praiseworthy such a statute may generally be, there is
always the possibility that the interests of an individual may be lost
to the demands of the whole body politic.
There have been a wealth of cases brought pursuant to the FOIA,
some of which have managed to clarify various ambiguities and
others of which have obfuscated what was apparently straightfor-
ward. Most cases have repeated the truism that the FOIA is to be
construed as a liberal disclosure statute and that the exemptions are
to be applied as narrowly as possible. 0 A brief analysis of several of
the leading cases shows, however, that there is less than unanimous
agreement about the meaning of the specific provisions of the stat-
ute. Furthermore, the overall effect of the decisions seems to have
been to limit rather than to expand the areas of disclosure. The
following discussion summarizes the principal cases which have
examined the various statutory exemptions to mandatory disclo-
sure.
The first category exempts material which is subject to an execu-
tive order of secrecy for reasons of national security or foreign policy
if the material is properly classified pursuant to the order. In
Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink" the United States Su-
preme Court carved out a fairly large loophole which leaves the
29. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967); Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122
(9th Cir. 1975).
30. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975); Renegotiation Bd. v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co., Inc., 415 U.S. 1 (1974); Montrose Chem. Corp. of Calif. v. Train,
491 F.2d 63 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Cuneo v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied sub nom. Rosen v. Vaughan, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
31. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1976). See note 11 supra.
32. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
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President with considerable authority to prevent the disclosure of
information which he designates as secret pursuant to an executive
order.
In July, 1971, news reports indicated that President Nixon had
received contradictory advice with respect to the advisability of
conducting certain planned underground nuclear tests. Representa-
tive Patsy Mink, after reading the news stories, asked the President
to release the various recommendations and reports. He refused and
Representative Mink, together with thirty-two of her colleagues in
the House, commenced an action under the FOIA to compel release
of the information, most of which had been classified either as
"Secret" or "Top Secret." The district court denied the requested
relief and held that the materials requested were protected by both
the first and fifth exemptions.13 (The latter limits the release of
inter- or intra-agency memoranda or letters which would not be
available except, in certain circumstances, to a party in litigation
with the agency) .3 The court of appeals reversed, reasoning that
nonsecret portions of the documents should be disclosed, and re-
manded the case for an in camera review by the trial court to deter-
mine whether the secret sections were separable from the nonsecret
portions.3 But the United States Supreme Court reversed the court
of appeals and prevented Representative Mink and her colleagues
from gaining access to the documents in question.36
The net effect of the decision was to prevent the use of the FOIA
as a device for testing the correctness of a security classification and
to allow the President to use his classification authority to prevent
the disclosure of significant quantities of material. Furthermore, the
Court rejected the notion that a judge could make an in camera
inspection of contested documents to separate the secret from the
nonsecret. A single classification covers an entire document even if
only one sentence in the document is secret7.3 Justice Stewart, in his
33. The trial court decision was not reported. For a discussion of the ruling see Mink v.
EPA, 464 F.2d 742, 743-44 (D.C. Cir. 1971). There was a separate action brought to enjoin
the test itself, Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg (D.C. Civ. Action No. 1346-
71). The plaintiffs lost at all levels and the test was conducted the day that the Supreme
Court denied an application for an injunction. Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v.
Schlesinger, 404 U.S. 917 (1971). See Environmental Protection Agency v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 75 n.1 (1973).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976). The general purpose of this exemption seems to be to give
statutory recognition to documents akin to an attorney's "work product." For more on this
point, see notes 49-56 & accompanying text infra.
35. 464 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
36. 410 U.S. at 94.
37. Id. at 83-84.
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concurring opinion, noted the size .and impact of the loophole in the
law:
One would suppose that a nuclear test that engendered fierce controversy
within the Executive Branch of our Government would be precisely the
kind of event that should be opened to the fullest possible disclosure
consistent with legitimate interests of national defense. Without such dis-
closure, factual information available to the concerned Executive agencies
cannot be considered by the people or evaluated by the Congress. And
WILII LIhe po ut and their -re a reduced to a..... . . f..a.r.r.,
the democratic process is paralyzed. But the Court's opinion demonstrates
that Congress has conspicuously failed to attack the problem that my
Brother Douglas discusses. Instead, it has built into the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act an exemption that provides no means to question an Execu-
tive decision to stamp a document "secret," however cynical, myopic, or
even corrupt that decision might have been."
Justice Brennan correctly noted that the majority had utterly
ignored the clause in the statutory exemption which provides that
material can only be withheld if it is labelled confidential "in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy. ' 39 There was simply
no judicial consideration of the relationship between the documents
sought and national defense or foreign policy concerns. The failure
of the Court to pay any attention to that language effectively re-
moved the one statutory limitation on the President's power to
avoid the impact of the FOIA in the general area of defense and
foreign policy. It may safely be said that Mink assures the executive
of continued authority to prevent the disclosure of significant
amounts of data about matters of considerable public concern and
controversy. On the other hand, it should be noted that a litigant
may compel the production of classified information if the classifi-
cation was not specifically authorized by executive order. This may
be of some assistance in preventing an agency from applying an
unduly expansive interpretation to a particular executive order.40
The second category of exemptions," which allows intra-agency
personnel rules and practices to be withheld, has not given rise to
any significant litigation.2
38. Id. at 94-95 (Stewart, J., concurring).
39. Id. at 96-97 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Marshall
joined in this opinion.
40. See, e.g., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v. Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1975).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (1976). See note 11 supra.
42. The apparent purpose of this exemption was to provide government employees with
the same measure of privacy normally extended to employees in private business. It might,
of course, be argued that taxpayers have a legitimate interest in personnel matters involving
Access to Government Information
The third category43 has, however, presented some interesting
conflicts. It exempts from the impact of the FOIA information
which is specifically protected from disclosure by another statute.
Typical examples of the application of this category were the cases
of Baker v. Central Intelligence Agency," and Mason v. Callaway.'5
In Baker former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employees
sought the disclosure of personnel regulations and vacancy notices
for jobs, but these were clearly within the scope of another statute
which prohibited their disclosure." In Mason the plaintiff was
denied access to reports of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) inves-
tigations on persons suspected of tax evasion for the reason that
such data are required to be kept confidential by a provision of the
Internal Revenue Code.47
In point of fact, the Supreme Court has severely limited the per-
missible scope of judicial inquiry into whether reliance on another
statute to avoid FOIA disclosure is legitimate. In a case involving
an attempt to obtain certain information from the Federal Aviation.
Administration, Justice Stewart, concurring in the judgment, de-
scribed the limitations:
[Wihen an agency asserts a right to withhold information based on a
specific Statute of the kind described in Exemption 3, the only question
to be determined in a district court's de novo inquiry is the factual exist-
ence of such a statute, regardless of how unwise, self-protective, or inad-
vertent the enactment might be."
The most sensitive problem, especially from the viewpoint of gov-
ernment employees, is the relationship between the FOIA and 18
U.S.C. Section 1905 which prohibits, under pain of criminal sanc-
tions, the disclosure of broad categories of information collected by
the government unless the dislosure is "authorized by law."49 Ob-
public servants, but public discussion could obviously make personnel management almost
impossible.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (1976). See note 11 supra.
44. 425 F. Supp. 663 (D.D.C. 1977).
45. 554 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1977).
46. 50 U.S.C. § 403g (1970).
47. 26 U.S.C. § 6103 (1976).
48. FAA v. Robertson, 422 U.S. 255, 269-70 (1975). (Stewart, J., concurring in the judg-
ment).
49. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (1976) provides that:
Whoever, being an officer or employee of the United States or of any department
or agency thereof, publishes, divulges, discloses, or makes known in any manner or
to any extent not authorized by law any information coming to him in the course
of his employment or official duties or by reason of any examination or investigation
made by, or return, report or record made to or filed with, such department or
1979]
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viously, a civil servant does not want to run the risk of violating a
criminal statute in order to comply with a request filed under the
FOIA.
In 1976 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia said that
the third exemption did not operate to incorporate section 1905 into
the FOIA.5 But in April, 1977, the question of the relationship of
section 1905 to the FOIA was reopened by the same court in Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. GSA," where the court said, "that § 1905 must
be 'considered independent of the FOIA" exe-ptions. '" Titl Sears
opinion was written partly in response to a conflicting decision by
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Westinghouse Electric Corp.
v. Schlesinger.53 The Westinghouse case involved an attempt by
defense contractors to enjoin the disclosure by the Department of
Defense of what they considered to be sensitive and confidential
information supplied by them to the government in connection with
their contracting activities. The Defense Department maintained
that disclosure was not prohibited and that section 1905 was not
within the group of statutes referred to by the third exemption.
Even if section 1905 were incorporated into the FOIA exemptions,
the Defense Department argued that the decision as to disclosure
was within the discretion of the agency. In this somewhat unusual
case, the court disagreed with the Defense Department and decided
that there might be a section 1905 problem and, if section 1905 were
applicable, there would be no agency discretion.
The net effect of these decisions is to cast some uncertainty on the
effect of the FOIA as against certain nondisclosure statutes. Ob-
viously, Congress can limit the FOIA by increasing the scope of
agency or officer or employee thereof, which information concerns or relates to the
trade secrets, processes, operations, style of work, or apparatus, or to the identity,
confidential statistical data, amount or source of any income, profits, losses, or
expenditures of any person, firm, partnership, corporation, or association; or per-
mits any income return or copy thereof or any book containing any abstract or
particulars thereof to be seen or examined by any person except as provided by law;
shall be fined not more than $1,000, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both;
and shall be removed from office or employment.
50. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Earlier the District of Columbia District Court had ruled that § 1905 "does not prevent
disclosure of confidential information that is authorized to be disclosed under other laws,"
including the FOIA. Schapiro v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 469-70 (D.D.C. 1972).
51. 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
52. Id. at 1385, quoting Government Br. at 34. See Note, The Effect of the 1976 Amend-
ment to Exemption Three of the Freedom Information Act, 76 COL. L. Rlv. 1029 (1976); 553
F.2d 1378, 1385 n.36.
53. 542 F.2d 1190 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied sub nom. Brown v. Westinghouse, 431 U.S.
924 (1977).
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nondisclosure statutes. Similarly, a broad interpretation of a statute
by an agency may well lead to the nondisclosure of substantial
amounts of information or to protracted litigation. There has cer-
tainly been no clear direction offered by the courts.
The fourth exemption,5' which prohibits the disclosure of trade
secrets and other confidential commercial or financial information,
was clearly designed to protect business firms from wholesale publi-
cation of sensitive information provided by them to the government.
In order to fit within this exemption it must be shown that the
information is commercial or financial, that it has been obtained
from a person required to submit such data, and that the informa-
tion is privileged or confidential." The courts have been consistent
in requiring that all three statutory conditions be met for the appli-
cation of this exemption.16 A bare claim of confidentiality for finan-
cial information, as an example, is not enough.57 The exemption will
only be applied if disclosure is likely either to impair the govern-
ment's ability to obtain necessary information in the future or to
cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the party
providing the information. 8
Perhaps the most interesting use of the fourth exemption occurred
in a case which involved sensitive foreign policy issues. The Export-
Import Bank made a loan to the Bank of Foreign Trade, an agency
of the Soviet Union. An FOIA suit was brought to compel the disclo-
sure of the terms of the loan. In an expansive reading of the exemp-
tion, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit denied the relief
sought on the grounds that the Bank of Foreign Trade was a
"person" entitled to the protection of the trade secrets exemption."
That case may be aberrational because of the parties involved, al-
though it does stand for the proposition that non-Americans are
54. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4) (1976). See note 11 supra.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.), appeal for stay denied, 404 U.S.
1204 (1971); Grumman Aircraft v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578 (D.C. Cir. 1970), rev'd,
421 U.S. 168 (1975).
57. Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73 (D.C.
Cir. 1974), rehearing denied, 562 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
58. National Parks v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) affd in part, rev'd in part
and remanded, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See also Bristol-Myers v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970). Even though information may have been
submitted pursuant to some understanding of confidentiality, it will be disclosed if it does
not meet the specific requirements of the FOIA. See Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD,
519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
59. Stone v. Export-Import Bank of the United States, 552 F.2d 132 (5th Cir.), rehearing
en banc denied, 555 F.2d 1391 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1012 (1978).
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entitled to the same statutory protections as are Americans. The
refusal to disclose Westinghouse's production plans so as not to
make them available to General Electric may well be justified, but
it is quite another thing to rule that the terms of a deal between an
American governmental agency and an agency of the government of
the Soviet Union may be kept secret in order to satisfy a foreign
government's interest in privacy.10
The fourth exemption has also spawned a number of "reverse-
FOIA" lawsuits. The law itself does not provide a mechanism for an
individual or a firm which has supplied information to the govern-
ment to prevent its disclosure. Nonetheless, the courts have been
receptive to suits brought to enjoin the government from disclosing
data which an individual or firm considers to be private.6' The
fourth exemption, with its protection of trade secrets, has been a
particularly important statutory basis for many of these suits. They
have provided an awkward but reasonably effective means for the
protection of interests in privacy. The government is required to
defend FOIA suits and to represent the interests of individuals or
firms which would prefer to avoid disclosure, but a government
agency will rarely have the same commitment to the protection of
confidentiality as the individual or firm which has provided the
information. The allowance of such suits does, however, lessen the
impact of the FOIA as a disclosure statute.2
60. There may, of course, be diplomatic considerations involved, but that raises a differ-
ent set of policy questions.
61. As one court has said, each exemption "is intended for the benefit of persons who
supply information as well as the agencies which gather it." National Parks and Conserva-
tionists Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D. C. Cir. 1974), aff'd. in part, rev'd. in part and
remanded sub nom. National Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Kleppe, 547 F.2d 673 (D.C.
Cir. 1976). See note 50 supra.
62. "Reverse-FOIA" suits include: Planning Research Corp. v. FPC, 555 F.2d 970 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. EEOC, 435 F. Supp. 751 (D.D.C. 1977); National Parks and Conservationists Ass'n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Parkridge Hosp., Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,
430 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Tenn. 1977); Burroughs Corp. v. Schlesinger, 403 F. Supp. 633 (E.D.
Va. 1975); Pharmaceutical Mfgs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 401 F. Supp. 444 (D.D.C. 1975);
Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 392 F. Supp. 1246 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 542 F.2d 1190
(D.C. Cir. 1974); McCoy v. Weinberger, 386 F. Supp. 504 (W.D. Ky. 1974); Neal-Cooper
Grain Co. v. Kissinger, 385 F. Supp. 769 (D.D.C. 1974); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. GSA, 384
F. Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974);
reconsidered, 402 F. Supp. 378 (D.D.C. 1975), remanded, 553 F.2d 1378 (D.D. Cir. 1977);
Charles River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 360 F. Supp. 212 (D.D.C. 1973), remanded for
reconsideration, 519 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir. 1975). See also Consumers Union v. Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n, 561 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See generally Note, Reverse Freedom of
Information Suits: Confidential Information in Search of Protection, 70 N.W. UNIV. L. Rav.
995 (1976).
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The fifth category 3 of exemptions really gets at the heart of the
concerns which prompted the passage of the FOIA. It protects inter-
and intra-agency memoranda which would not be available to a
party in litigation with the agency, i.e., those which would not nor-
mally be subject to the discovery process. Certainly there is an
argument to be made that secrecy may encourage a free-wheeling
discussion and the consideration of a wider range of views than
would be available in a public forum. On the other hand, there is
an argument that the public has an interest in learning how the
decision making process works and in knowing that opinions, ideas,
and facts were considered by an agency before it reached a final
decision. The various judicial opinions have been somewhat un-
clear, but there has been a tendency to opt in favor of the former
consideration.
The first two significant cases resulted in victory for those seeking
disclosure, but the cases were relatively straightforward. In the first,
American Mail Line v. Gulick,6 1 the Maritime Subsidy Board had-
ordered American Mail Line to refund $3.3 million in subsidy pay-
ments. The only basis cited for the order was a certain internal
memorandum which the Subsidy Board refused to disclose. The
court had little difficulty in justifying an order compelling the re-
lease of the memorandum. If nothing else, the case supports the
proposition that an otherwise protected document loses its confiden-
tial status when it is publicly cited in support of a ruling. A year
later, in Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 5 the same court ordered the FTC
to release certain documents relating to a rule-making procedure
because they were purely factual reports and scientific studies and
were not "internal working papers in which opinions are expressed
and policies formulated and recommended. '" 6 1
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit took a somewhat
more limited view of the FOIA's disclosure requirements in
Polymers, Inc. v. NLRB. The plaintiff company had been found to
have committed an unfair labor practice when it refused to bargain
with a Board-certified bargaining representative. Polymers charged
that there were irregularities in the election process. The NLRB
investigated and determined that there were no problems, but, upon
request, it refused to provide Polymers with one of its documents,
entitled "A Guide to the Conduct of Elections." The Second Circuit
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976). See note 11 supra.
64. 411 F.2d 696 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
65. 424 F.2d 935 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824 (1970).
66. Id. at 939, quoting Ackerly v. Ley, 420 F.2d 1336, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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refused to order disclosure because it decided that the material
played no significant role in the Board's adjudication of election
disputes. 8 In fact, the court seemed to use a relevance test in decid-
ing not to order disclosure: "[w]hile the interest of the Board in
refusing to produce the Guide is not clear, its relevance to the in-
stant controversy is even less clear."69 This reasoning turns the
FOIA on its head. If its purpose is to make government material
generally available except in certain limited instances, then the
burden should be on the agency to show why there should not be
disclosure. The burden should not be on the requesting party to
prove relevance.
When faced with similar questions the Supreme Court adhered to
the generally narrow view adopted in Mink0 and adopted a restric-
tive interpretation of the fifth exemption in two 1975 cases, NLRB
v. Sears Roebuck & Co.7 and Renegotiation Board v. Grumman
Aircraft Engineering Co. 7 2
Sears sought to compel the disclosure of advice and appeals me-
moranda of the General Counsel to the NLRB. The trial court found
that appeals memoranda were "final opinions" and therefore not
within the exemption.7 3 The court of appeals affirmed." Grumman
sued for the disclosure of Regional and Division reports of the Rene-
gotiation Board. The district court ordered disclosure of the reports
as "final opinions"' '75 and the court of appeals affirmed.76 The cases
were consolidated for consideration by the United States Supreme
Court which held that advice and appeals memoranda prepared by
the NLRB's General Counsel which direct the dismissal of unfair
labor practice charges are final opinions and must be disclosed
under the FOIA,77 but neither advice and appeals memoranda which
direct that complaints be filed nor Regional and Division reports of
the Renegotiation Board are final opinions of an agency but, in-
stead, are exempt from FOIA disclosure requirements as pre-
67. 414 F.2d 999 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1010 (1969).
68. See notes 29-35 & accompanying text supra.
69. Id. at 1006.
70. 410 U.S. 73 (1973). See notes 30-37 & accompanying text supra.
71. 421 U.S. 132 (1975).
72. 421 U.S. 168 (1975).
73. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. NLRB, 346 F. Supp. 751, 754 (D.D.C. 1972).
74. 480 F.2d 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
75. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r. Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 325 F. Supp. 1146, 1152-54
(D.D.C. 1971).
76. 482 F.2d 710 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
77. NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 155-59 (1975).
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decisional intra-agency memoranda." In sum, the United States
Supreme Court held that the FOIA applies only to memoranda
which reflect the ultimate administrative disposition of a case. This
result has been sharply criticized:
The Supreme Court construction of the FOIA disclosure requirements
detrimentally restrict the applicability of those provisions without bring-
ing about significant concomitant benefits. The Renegotiation Board, ex-
empted from writing decisions, will continue to accept without comment
the now secret determinations of the Regional Boards. The General Coun-
sel of the NLRB will continue to make prosecutorial decisions for that
agency without providing general access to memoranda containing the
reasons for such decisions. In each case, the result will be to insulate from
public scrutiny and review the standards these agencies apply in carrying
out their administrative and adjudicative functions.7
Perhaps the most interesting litigation has centered on the sixth
exemption, sN which protects personnel, medical, and "similar" files.
These cases have usually presented a conflict between the public's
interest in knowing about a particular subject and an individual's
right to privacy. There have been two principal interpretation prob-
lems: (1) what is a "similar" file?; and (2) what is a "clearly unwar-
ranted" invasion of privacy? Neither question has been definitively
answered, but several cases do offer some general guidelines.
An expansive reading of the term "similar file" was adopted by
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Wine Hobby, U.S.A., Inc. v.
IRS."' The plaintiffs, who were manufacturers of winemaking
equipment, wanted a list of all persons within a certain geographic
area who had registered as amateur, noncommercial winemakers
with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. The court up-
held the refusal of the IRS to divulge the information: "[wie do not
believe that the use of the term 'similar' was intended to narrow the
78. Id. at 159-160; Renegotiation Bd. v. Grumman Aircraft Eng'r. Corp. 421 U.S. 168, 185-
90.
79. Note, Freedom of Information Act-Agency Secrecy Continues, 52 WASH. L. REv. 121,
140 (1976). For further discussion of this exemption after the Sears and Grumman cases see
Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1977); Cooper v. Department of the
Navy, 558 F.2d 274 (5th Cii!. 1977); Pope v. United States, 424 F. Supp. 962 (S.D. Tex 1977);
Shaver v. Bell, 433 F. Supp. 438 (N.D. Ga. 1977). In Deering Milliken the court suggested
that an attorney's "work product" which was protected from discovery pursuant to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure would also be exempted from FOIA disclosure. In Cooper, a case
involving a claim for the death of a Marine in a helicopter crash, the Navy was required to
disclose the Judge Advocate's investigation report but not the report of the aircraft accident
safety investigation.
80. .5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). See note 11 supra.
81. 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974).
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exemption from disclosure and permit the release of files which
would otherwise be exempt because of the resultant invasion of
privacy."8 In effect, the court read "similar file" to mean any file
containing personal information which may be private regardless of
its relation to employment history or medical problems. 3
In Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Department of
Agriculture,"4 the government argued that a request for information
collected by the Department of Agriculture from individual citizens,
including data as to marital status, the legitimacy of children, med-
ical conditions, consumption of alcohol, and receipt of welfare pay-
ments would unreasonably invade the privacy of those who had
provided the information. There is perhaps some taxpayer interest
in the personal lives of welfare recipients, but the court of appeals
did not believe that the trial court had adequately considered
whether the interest was great enough to justify the exposure to
public scrutiny of the personal lives of those about whom informtion
had been collected. This case and Wine Hobby indicated a willing-
ness to treat the exemption as one which applies generally to data
of a personal nature, whether or not the data refer to employment
or medical history.
The parameters of the "similar file" provision may be further
clarified by reference to Robles v. EPA8 in which the plaintiffs
demanded the disclosure of reports concerning the radioactivity
level in houses in Grand Junction, Colorado, a town which had been
built atop a disposal area for radioactive wastes. The report con-
tained information indicating that some persons had been exposed
to high levels of radiation. The government argued that the reports
were exempted from disclosure because the data concerning radia-
tion exposures were of a private, medical nature. The court was
unimpressed:
The exemption applies only to information which relates to a specific
person or individual, to "intimate details" of a "highly personal nature"
in that individual's employment record or health history or the like, and
82. Id. at 135.
83. The decision may have broadened the intended scope of the exemption, but it was
clearly justifiable. The submittal of requested information to government agencies should not
make one fair game for mail order solicitations. By way of comparison, the Disabled Officer's
Association was successful in compelling the Department of Defense to release the names and
addresses of retired disabled officers. Disabled Officer's ass'n v. Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454
(D.D.C. 1977).
84. 498 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir.), supplemented, 511 F.2d 1347 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
85. 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1136 (1974).
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has no relevancy to information that deals with physical things such as
structures as in this case."
The court's dismissal of the medical files argument might have
been too glib. The information requested was certainly more closely
related to health questions than to "physical things," but the result
was justifiable. The danger to the people of Grand Junction was
created by governmental action, and there was a clear public inter-
est in knowing what happened. Any individual's interest in keeping
confidential the fact of possible exposure was minimal by compari-
son.
The FOIA does not preclude the disclosure of personal informa-
tion if there is a sound reason for such disclosure. There is an unset-
tled controversy whether the test for determining the existence of a
sound reason is: (1) the general public interest in the specific data,
or (2) the use to which the requesting party intends to put the
information. Two differing approaches to the question are illus-
trated by the Fourth Circuit's opinion in the Robles case and the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
in Getman v. NLRB.87 In Robles the Fourth Circuit adopted a gen-
eral public interest test and stated that "disclosure was never in-
tended to 'depend on the interest or lack of interest of the party
seeking disclosure.' "'
In Getman the government resisted disclosure by invoking the
trade secrets exemption, but the rationale of the case could be ap-
plied generally and need not be limited to cases which focus on the
fourth exemption. The plaintiffs were two law professors who re-
quested copies of name and address lists of workers at certain plants
where union elections were about to be held so that the workers
could be solicited to participate in a study of the election process.
The court granted the professors' request."' In reaching that result,
the court of appeals focused on the intended use of the material
rather than on the public interest in the actual data or the interest
of the individual workers in being free from telephone or mail solici-
tations, even innocuous ones. The information requested was not of
an essentially private nature, and it could have been obtained from
other sources, such as city directories, the unions, or even the em-
ployers. Although Getman did not involve specifically personal in-
86. Id. at 845.
87. 450 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
88. 484 F.2d at 847, quoting K. DAvis, ADMINIsTRATIVE LAw 120 (1970 Supp.).
89. 450 F.2d at 672, 680.
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formation, the court's reliance on the intended use by the requesting
parties suggests that the appropriate test is not the general public
interest in the material, but the purposes for which the requesting
parties wanted the information. The identity of the recipient and
the intended use become the keys to disclosure rather than the
nature of the information itself.90
The Third Circuit has followed the general approach of Robles,9
and the Fourth Circuit has reaffirmed its own approach.2 The Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit has backed away from Getman to a certain
extent but has not unqualifiedly repudiated that approach. In the
Rural Housirig Alliance 3 case, the court generally followed Getman,
but in Ditlow v. Schultz,9 the court admitted that it was uncertain
"whether the balancing is to be performed in the context of unre-
stricted disclosure to the public or of a use-specified release confined
to the requesting parties." 5
The Supreme Court did not finally decide the issue, but it offered
some guidance in Department of the Air Force v. Rose.91 The plain-
tiffs were New York University law students who were working on
an article about discipline at the military academies and they
sought to obtain case summaries of honor code violations at the Air
Force Academy. The Air Force resisted disclosure on the ground
that the files contained sensitive personal information. The United
States Supreme Court ordered the files to be disclosed but only after
information which would identify the individuals who were involved
had been removed. Although the Court did not specifically consider
the conflict between Getman and Robles, it did couch its decision
in the language of a general public interest in the material rather
than in terms of the plaintiffs' identity or their intended use of the
information. Honor Code and ethical transgressions by potential
90. For a criticism of this approach, see Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's
Privacy Exemption and the Privacy Act of 1974, 11 HARv. Civ. R. & Civ. L. L. Rzv. 596, 611-
24 (1974).
91. See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977); Wine Hobby
U.S.A., Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d 133 (3d Cir. 1974). These two cases could have been analyzed
on the basis of Getman, and the result would probably have been the same. The Wine Hobby
plaintiffs wanted mailing lists to use for commercial solicitations. The Masonic Homes plain-
tiff was an employer who wanted copies of union authorization cards submitted by his em-
ployees to the NLRB in support of a petition for a union election. Clearly, disclosure to such
a plaintiff could have opened the possibility of severe abuses.
92. See Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d 1131.
93. See note 84 & accompanying text supra.
94. 517 F.2d 166 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
95. Id. at 171.
96. 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
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officers in the United States Air Force are certainly a matter of
legitimate concern to the taxpaying public. On the other hand, the
disciplinary system at the service academies is such that matters
which might be considered to be trivial indiscretions in civilian life
may result in disciplinary action. The stigma of such a proceeding
may far outweigh the seriousness of the offense. The Court believed
that the public interest in obtaining information about the internal
affairs of the Air Force Academy and the privacy interests of indi-
vidual cadets could, and should, be balanced against each other to
determine whether or not disclosure should be required. Applying
this balance, the Court concluded that both interests could be
served by requiring the disclosure of files only after personal identi-
fiers had been removed. 7
The peculiarities of specific cases may well be such that no clearly
objective standards can be developed for this exemption. The
weight of authority seems to lean toward a general public interest
test for disclosure, but, of course, the identity of the requesting
party may sometimes be critical to a determination of whether dis-
closure will constitute a "clearly unwarranted" privacy invasion.
The seventh category protects investigatory files compiled for law
enforcement purposes "except to the extent available by law to a
party other than another government agency." There has been con-
fusion about whether a proceeding must be imminent before the
exemption is applicable. For instance, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals has ruled that the exemption only applies when disclosure
might make it possible for criminal suspects to escape apprehension
and the possibility of conviction,"8 but in National Public Radio v.
Bell" a district court refused to order the release of a dormant file
because there was a remote possibility that it might one day form
the basis for criminal proceedings. A few years earlier in Schapiro
v. SEC, ,00 the same district court had ruled that an SEC staff study
on off-board trading problems could not be withheld because there
was no indication that a formal investigation was contemplated in
the near future. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a 1974
97. Id. at 380-82.
98. See Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1972).
99. 431 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1977). That case centered on an accident at a nuclear fuels
plant in which an employee had been contaminated and died from radiation exposure. The
materials in the Justice Department death investigation file were held to be exempt under
the fifth category because they included intra-agency advisory opinions and attorneys' work
products. The file on the contamination accident itself was withheld on the basis of the
seventh exemption.
100. 339 F. Supp. 467 (D.D.C. 1972).
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opinion, held that the exemption applies not only to criminal inves-
tigations, but to all law enforcement proceedings. 0' A reasonably
expansive definition of "investigatory file" has been adopted by the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Any inquiry which departs
from the routine "and which focuses with special intensity upon a
particular party is equivalent," or so that court has said, "to an
investigation. '" 102 But the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled
that a formal proceeding of some kind must be pending before the
exemption will apply.' Suffice it to say that the impact of this
exemption is uncertain and that its application is in flux. Certainly
there should not be wholesale disclosure of law enforcement files,
but the language of some of the judicial opinions does seem to afford
a great deal of leeway to government officials to categorize informa-
tion in ways which would justify its nondisclosure. '0
As of this writing there have been no cases of significance which
have arisen under the eighth or ninth categories.
Although the FOIA was intended to be a full disclosure statute,
there is no question that it has been less than uniformly successful.
Indeed, some commentators have suggested that the FOIA has not
really caused any significant increase in the disclosure of useful and
important information.0 5 There is an inertia in a bureaucracy which
tends to support a policy of nondisclosure rather than the opposite,
and the cost of pursuing an FOIA suit (or any federal litigation) can
be so high that all but wealthy firms and zealots are discouraged
101. See Moore-McCormack Lines v. ITO Corp. of Baltimore, 508 F.2d 945.
102. See Center for Nat'l Policy Rev. on Race and Urb. Issues v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d
370 (D.D.C. 1974).
103. See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
104. Some additional cases are instructive. In Luziach v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 31
(D. Minn. 1977), the plaintiff, who was being audited by the IRS, wanted to obtain a copy of
a letter from an informant which had apparently triggered the audit. The court ordered that
the letter be disclosed but only after certain identifying portions had been deleted. The
plaintiff was entitled to know the general basis for IRS suspicion, but the court did not want
the FOIA to be used as a means for subjecting government informers to harassment. Along
somewhat similar lines, the court refused to allow disclosure in Forrester v. Department of
Labor, 433 F. Supp. 987 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). The plaintiff there had filed an age discrimination
complaint which HEW, after an investigation, terminated for lack of probable cause. He
wanted to obtain the investigation report but the court denied the request because disclosure
would have been an unreasonable invasion of the privacy of those who had supplied data to
the HEW investigators-an interesting method for protecting the confidentiality of inform-
ants. See also NLRB v. Hardeman Garment Corp., 557 F.2d 559 (6th Cir. 1977); Kanter v.
IRS, 433 F. Supp. 812 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
105. See Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act-1974, 1975 DUKE L. J.
416 (1975); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A Seven-Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 895 (1974).
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from litigation. It does, however, provide a mechanism and a basis
from which to proceed in seeking to obtain information from the
government. If one is persistent enough to pursue litigation, the
government is put in the position of having to justify nondisclosure.
Judicial interpretation of ambiguous provisions have, however,
often tended to favor nondisclosure. With some exceptions the
courts have paid lip service to the general policy of disclosure and
have proceeded to apply the statute in ways that have left open a
number of very large loopholes which can be used to prevent access
to significant categories of data.
II. THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974
The Privacy Act of 1974'"4 was enacted as an amendment to the
FOIA, but it was intended to address a substantially different set
of problems. The Privacy Act manifested a growing concern about
the collection of massive amounts of information by the govern-
ment'07 and the possibilities for the misuse of that information.' 8
The Act was originally intended to be only one of a body of privacy
106. Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-759, 88 Stat. 1896 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1976)).
107. The computer, in particular, has revolutionized data collection and retrieval. For
instance, a 1974 study of 54 federal agencies revealed that there were 858 computerized data
banks containing 1.25 billion records on individual citizens. STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON CON-
STrrUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93D CONG., 2D SESs., FEDERAL
DATA BANKS & CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IV (1974).
108. Congress stated the purpose of the Act as follows:
The purpose of this Act is to provide certain safeguards for an individual against
an invasion of personal privacy by requiring Federal agencies, except as otherwise
provided by law, to-
(1) permit an individual to determine what records pertaining to him are col-
lected, maintained, used, or disseminated by such agencies;
(2) permit an individual to prevent records pertaining to him obtained by such
agencies for a particular purpose from being used or made available for another
purpose without his consent;
(3) permit an individual to gain access to information pertaining to him in Fed-
eral agency records, to have a copy made of all or any portion thereof, and to correct
or amend such records;
(4) collect, maintain, use, or disseminate any record of identifiable personal
information in a manner that assures that such action is for a necessary and lawful
purpose, that the information is current and accurate for its intended use, and that
adequate safeguards are provided to prevent misuse of such information;
(5) permit exemptions from the requirements with respect to records provided in
this Act only in those cases where there is an important public policy need for such
exemption as has been determined by specific statutory authority; and
.(6) be subject to civil suit for any damages which occur as a result of willful or
intentional action which violates any individual's rights under this Act.
Privacy Act of 1974, PuB. L. 93-579, § 2(b) (1974).
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statutes,09 but most of the companion legislation never became law.
The atmosphere in which the Privacy Act was debated was volatile,
and its eventual success was due at least in part to concern about
the abuses of governmental processes revealed by the various Wat-
ergate hearings, investigations, and trials."0 The thrust of the Pri-
vacy Act is to prevent rather than to require the disclosure of infor-
mation in the hands of government agencies, but like the FOIA, it
proceeds from a basic mistrust of government. One seeks to open the
processes of government to public scrutiny; the other seeks to pre-
vent abuses by government officials. In both instances the purpose
is to protect the integrity of the governing process and the rights of
individual citizens. Unfortunately, the two laws may work at cross
purposes.
The final version of the Privacy Act was a compromise between
significantly different House and Senate versions which was hur-
riedly put together so that it could be voted on before Congress
recessed. One observer characterized it as "an outstanding demon-
stration of legislative chaos.""' The law generally recognizes privacy
as a constitutional right and provides a means for an individual to
learn what the government knows about him, to correct mistakes,
and to prevent the dissemination of information which he considers
to be private, subject to a countervailing public interest in disclo-
sure. An aggrieved individual may bring a damages action against
the United States to seek redress for an unauthorized disclosure and
a government employee who violates the Act may be charged with
a misdemeanor and be subject to a fine of up to $5,000. Liability in
both civil and criminal cases must be founded upon a willful and
intentional violation. Negligence is not punished." 2 In general, no
information about an individual which is in government hands may
be disclosed without the prior written consent of the individual, but
there are eleven exceptions." 3
109. J. O'REILLY, FEDiERAL INFORMATION DiScLosurE 20-22 (1977).
110. Indeed, one commentator has said that Watergate was the "vehicle for votes and for
progress through the House and the Senate," O'REiLLY, supra note 109, at 20-23. There was
significant opposition to the proposed legislation by the Nixon Administration. See Hearings
on Privacy Before Senate Committee on Government Operations and Senate Judiciary
Committee, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 440-86 (1973); O'REmL, supra note 109, at 20-28 & n.24.
111. Note, The Privacy Act of 1974, 1976 WASH. L.Q. 667, 679 (1976).
112. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g), 552a(i).
113. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) provides as follows:
No agency shall disclose any record which is contained in a system of records by
any means of communication to any person, or to another agency, except pursuant
to a written request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom
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Considering the ambiguities inherent in some of the exceptions to
the nondisclosure rule, the Privacy Act has given rise to surprisingly
few cases. As of this writing, there have been only ten significant
Privacy Act cases, and of these, only three were initiated by parties
who were seeking to prevent disclosure. Six were brought by liti-
gants who were trying to get information, and in one the issue of
disclosure was not central.
Before the Privacy Act even became effective, one case did estab-
lish a general judicial tone for the consideration of cases likely to
arise under the Act. The Department of Health, Education and
Welfare periodically makes computer comparisons between the lists
of persons receiving social security benefits and those receiving Vet-
erans Administration (VA) payments in order to identify those indi-
viduals who fail to report their social security income to the VA,
because allowable VA benefits are related to social security receipts.
A Mr. Jaffess was upset by this exchange of information between
the VA and the Social Security Administration, and sued to stop
the record pertains, unless disclosure of the record would be-
(1) to those officers and employees of the agency which maintains the record who
have a need for the record in the performance of their duties;
(2) required under section 552 of this title;
(3) for a routine use as defined in subsection (a)(7) of this section and described
under subsection (e)(4)(D) of this section;
(4) to the Bureau of the Census for purposes of planning or carrying out a census
or survey or related activity pursuant to the provisions of title 13;
(5) to a recipient who has provided the agency With advance adequate written
assurance that the record will be used solely as a statistical research or reporting
record, and the record is to be transferred in a form that is not individually identifi-
able;
(6) to the National Archives of the United States as a record which has sufficient
historical or other value to warrant its continued preservation by the United States
Government, or for evaluation by the Administrator of General Services or his
designee to determine whether the record has such value;
(7) to another agency or to an instrumentality of any governmental jurisdiction
within or under the control of the United States for a civil or criminal law enforce-
ment activity if the activity is authorized by law, and if the head of the agency or
instrumentality has made a written request to the agency which maintains the
record specifying the particular portion desired and the law enforcement activity
for which the record is sought;
(8) to a person pursuant to a showing of compelling circumstances affecting the
health or safety of an individual if upon such disclosure notification is transmitted
to the last known address of such individual;
(9) to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction,
any committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or sub-
committee of any such joint committee;
(10) to the Comptroller General, or any of his authorized representatives, in the
course of the performance of the duties of the General Accounting Office; or
(11) pursuant to the order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
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it."' The suit was premised in part on the FOIA, but the district
court determined that the plaintiff could not use the FOIA because
he had not exhausted intra-agency administrative remedies. The
action proceeded as an invasion of privacy suit, and the plaintiff was
ultimately unsuccessful, because the court found that, "[tihe pres-
ent thrust of decisional law does not include within its compass the
right of an individual to prevent disclosure by one governmental
agency to another of matters obtained in the course of transmitting
the agency's regular functions."" 5 Obviously, the Jaffess case does
not necessarily limit the legislative impact of the Privacy Act, but
its rationale is certainly applicable. There can be abuses in the
wholesale sharing of data among government agencies. A classic
example would be the disclosure to executive department officials
of the tax records of their political opponents. However, it is not
difficult to justify the kind of information sharing that was at issue
in Jaffess. Recipients of VA benefits are only entitled to a certain
amount of compensation. Failure to make accurate reports of other
federal payments with a resulting and illegitimate increase in re-
ceipts is nothing more than fraud.
The exceptions to the Privacy Act's nondisclosure rules include
material which is released simply for "routine use.""' The question
of "routine use" and the scope of an FOIA exemption were at issue
in American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) v. De-
fense General Supply Center."7 Although it was essentially a Pri-
vacy Act case, the plaintiffs were trying to compel disclosure. Under
the terms of a collective bargaining agreement with AFGE the gov-
ernment was obligated to furnish the union with certain employee
information, and it had done so for some time. Two days before the
effective date of the Privacy Act, the government informed the
union that it would no longer furnish the data because the union did
not have the written consent of the affected employees. The union
argued that the disclosure amounted to a "routine use" because it
was compelled by the contract. The union lost, and the decision
opened the possibility for a rather expansive application of the Pri-
vacy Act as a method for avoiding the kind of disclosure mandated
114. Jaffess v. HEW, 393 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Interestingly, another district
court has taken the position that the Privacy Act governed any case pending at the time the
Act became effective. Mervin v. Bonfati, 410 F. Supp. 1205 (D.D.C. 1976). But cf. Meisch v.
United States Army, 435 F. Supp. 344 (E.D. Mo. 1977).
115. 393 F. Supp. at 630.
116. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(3). See note 98 supra.
117. 423 F. Supp. 481 (E.D. Va. 1976), aff'd 573 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1978).
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by the FOIA. The court reasoned that the distribution of the data
in question to the union could, in fact, have been justified as a
"routine use," but that it was not irrational or arbitrary for the
defendant agency to have decided otherwise. The AFGE case left
agencies with a great deal of discretion in determining the meaning
of the term "routine use." A narrow meaning, so long as it was not
irrational or arbitrary, could substantially broaden the scope of the
information protected from disclosure. If the information were argu-
ably within the scope of the FOIA exemptions, the agency's discre-
tion to withhold would be even greater.
The competing interests sometimes served by the Privacy Act
were also apparent in Mervin v. Bonfanti. "I Mr. Mervin had applied
for a position with the Social Security Administration as a hearing
examiner. He was turned down for the job and he brought a Privacy
Act suit to gain access to unfavorable evaluations which had been
submitted to the government in connection with his application.
Although the trial judge agreed that, "an individual normally has
a right to inspect any records which the government maintains on
him,""' he also noted that there was a need to protect the individual
who has written a frank evaluation on the condition that he not be
revealed as a source. To balance these interests, the court decided
to make an in camera evaluation. 20
In terms of the relationship of the FOIA to the Privacy Act, the
two most significant cases have been Tennessean Newspapers, Inc.
v. Levi 21 and Sonderegger v. Department of the Interior.2  The
Tennessee newspaper case was a graphic example of the misuse of
a statute by an official. A United States Attorney halted his routine
of information about arrests and indictments for the stated reason
that such releases violated the Privacy Act rights of the subjects.
The local press brought a FOIA action and won. The court reasoned
that there is a legitimate public interest in learning the identity of
criminal suspects and that, in any event, the information was com-
monplace. The Sonderegger case is interesting principally because
of the reluctance of the court to employ the Privacy Act. Victims of
the Teton Dam disaster brought suit under both the FOIA and the
Privacy Act to prevent the disclosure of certain information. The
118. 410 F. Supp. 1205 (D.D.C. 1976).
119. Id. at 1207.
120. This approach was generally consistent with that adopted by the Supreme Court in
Department of the Air Force v. Rose. See note 96 & accompanying text supra.
121. 403 F. Supp. 1308 (M.D. Tenn. 1975).
122. 424 F. Supp. 847 (D. Idaho 1976).
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court simply ignored the Privacy Act and proceeded to develop fur-
ther the basic reverse-FOIA theory. The result was substantially in
favor of the plaintiffs.
Other Privacy Act cases have dealt principally with procedural
and peripheral issues'23 and have done little to expand upon the
statute itself. On its face, the Privacy Act presents a fundamental
policy conflict with the FOIA, although it is supposed to be subordi-
nated, in general, to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the
FOIA.12 ' The interplay between the statutes is most significant in
connection with categories of information which may be exempted
from mandatory FOIA disclosure and which might, under the FOIA,
be disclosed or not in the agency's discretion. A federal bureaucrat
may find himself in a bit of a dilemma. Suppose that he has infor-
mation or documents which may fall within one of the categories
exempt from mandatory disclosure. He can, in his discretion, choose
to disclose the information, but if it is within an exempt category,
then it probably falls within the ambit of the Privacy Act, and, if
he wrongfully makes such information public, he may be personally
subject to suit. On the other hand, if he plays it safe, someone might
(but probably will not) try to compel disclosure through a civil suit
against the agency, but so long as the individual bureaucrat has a
reasonable, good faith belief that the information may be protected
from disclosure, he should be individually safe from sanctions.
Thus, even if the Privacy Act is "subordinate" to the FOIA, it may
effectively stymie the FOIA.'2
123. One litigant tried to use the Privacy Act as a device to expand his discovery in a
criminal case. United States v. Murdock, 548 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1977). The attempt was
unsuccessful, which was consistent with FOIA cases. See, e.g., Renegotiation Bd. v. Banner-
craft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974). Failure to pursue Privacy Act remedies in connection
with a dismissal proceeding did not bar a separate action for reinstatement, back pay and
other damages. Churchwell v. United States, 414 F. Supp. 499 (D.S.D. 1976). On the other
hand, pursuit to a final decision of an applicable administrative remedy may estop one from
bringing a Privacy Act lawsuit. Nolen v. Roudebush, 549 F.2d 341 (5th Cir. 1977). On the
question of identity of the proper defendants in a Privacy Act case, see Rowe v. Tennessee,
431 F. Sup. 1256 (E.D. Tenn. 1977).
124. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(b)(2), (c)(1), (e)(6) (1976).
125. See Comment, The Freedom of Information Act's Privacy Exemption and the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974 supra note 90, at 627. Two writers have even gone so far as to suggest that a
new federal agency should be established simply to deal with FOIA requests and to reconcile
the applications of the two statutes. Harms & Relya, A Policy Assessment of the Privacy Act
of 1974, 25 AM. UNIV. L. REv. 555, 591 (1976). That would probably accomplish nothing more
than the creation of another bureaucratic hurdle. For more on the Privacy Act, see Comment,
The Privacy Act of 1974: An Overview and Critique, 1976 WASH. U. L. Q. 667 (1976). For
additional comments on the interplay between the FOIA and the Privacy Act, see Hirschorn,
Sunshine for Federal Agencies, 63 A.B.A. J. 55 (1977); Kovach, A Retrospective Look at the
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In a very real sense the laudable purposes of the two statutes may
be negated by their contradictory applications with the result that
little is gained in terms of public access to information about impor-
tant governmental processes. There is no doubt that the FOIA has
unlocked a number of previously secret files. There is also the possi-
bility that the Privacy Act may provide some protection against the
misuse of confidential information. However, both acts are replete
with loopholes, the net effect of which is to place blockades in the
path of those seeking to learn more about what the government is
doing. Despite their shortcomings, these statutes are all that pro-
vide a basic framework for access to and protection from the bulk
of government data.
III. ACCESS TO INFORMATION-CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
What Congress can give, Congress can usually take away. The
political mood of the past decade has tended to favor legislation
which mandates openness in government. The climate may change
by the end of the next decade and greater restrictions may be im-
posed on disclosures. Thus, if the question of access to information,
whether generally as required by the FOIA or individually as re-
quired by the Privacy Act, is one which is to be left to legislative
discretion, the degree of access allowed from time to time may sub-
stantially change. 2' On the other hand, if the state's control over
information which it possesses were subject to constitutional limita-
tions, then press and public might be able to compel the release of
materials or gain entry to institutions or facilities even if there were
no clear statutory procedure for so doing.
The question of access to information as a constitutional right is
certainly not a new one to the Supreme Court.' 7 It has addressed
Privacy and Freedom of Information Act, 27, LAB. L.J. 548 (1976); Markham, Sunshine on
the Administrative Process: Wherein Lies the Shade?, 28 ADMiN. L.J. 463 (1976); Comment,
Informational Privacy and Public Records, 8 PAC. L.J. 25 (1977).
126. There is always some fragility in the long term stability of a political decision. The
FOIA and the Privacy Act, however, have specific handicaps. Both statutes were opposed by
the Executive Branch, and although the Carter Administration may not have the antipathy
toward such legislation that characterized both the Johnson and Nixon Administrations,
there will likely be some continued hostility evidenced by those agencies which are the focus
of the laws. To repeal either would, of course, require majority support on both sides of the
Capitol and repeal is certainly not a political likelihood anytime soon. But a hostile President
could veto any substantial changes in the legislation which might force greater disclosure,
and he would need to muster only one-third of the votes of the House or Senate to sustain
the veto-and that is certainly a possibility.
127. See generally Fenner, The Rights of the Press and the Closed Court Criminal
Proceeding, 57 NEB. L. REV. 442 (1978); Comment, The Right of the Press to Gather Informa-
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the issue directly and indirectly in a variety of circumstances, but
until the past term it had never come up with a clearly defined
response. 2 ' In June 1978 the Court announced its opinion in
Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,"2 9 in which it decided that there is no
constitutional right of access to information in the government's
hands. Although the decision was clear, support for it was not over-
whelming. There was a majority result, to be sure, but two justices
did not participate 3 and Justice Stewart, who was the fourth mem-
ber of the four-man majority, filed a separate opinion concurring
only in the judgment. 3' Three dissented; 32 thus, the result was the
decision of a minority.
The dispute in Houchins developed from controversies involving
the operation of the Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, California.
There had been an inmate suicide at the jail, and conditions at the
facility had become a matter of considerable local concern. Total
control of access to the jail and to the inmates was in the hands of
the sheriff. KQED, a local television and radio station, broadcast a
report about the suicide that included a statement from a psychia-
trist attributing mental illnesses among the prisoners to deplorable
conditions at the jail. 3 3 Representatives of KQED then asked to be
allowed to inspect and to photograph the facilities. Permission was
denied. At that time there was apparently no policy concerning
public access to the jail. Fairly soon thereafter, KQED and local
tion After Branzburg and Pell, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 166 (1975); Comment, Prisons and the Right
of the Press to Gather Information: A Review of Pell v. Procunier and Saxbe v. Washington
Post Co., 43 U. CIN. L. REV. 913 (1974); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather
Information, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1505 (1974); Note, The Right of the Press to Gather
Information, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 838 (1971).
128. Most of the cases have involved press access to various aspects of the criminal
process. See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., - U.S. -, 98 S. Ct. 1306
(1978); United States v. Gurney, 558 F.2d 1202 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied sub nom. Miami
Herald Publishing Co. v. Krentzman, __ U.S -, 98 S. Ct. 1606 (1978). Until Houchins
was decided, this first term, the leading access cases were Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817
(1974) and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), both of which were concerned
with access to prison inmates. In those cases the Court found, in essence, that prisoners were
granted some access to the public at large and that under the circumstances there existing,
the press had no claim for greater access in its own right. The fundamental question of access
or not was not decided.
129. 98 S. Ct. 2588 (1978).
130. Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Id. at 2597.
131. Id. at 2598-99.
132. Justice Stevens wrote the dissenting opinion, in which Justices Brennan and Powell
joined. Id. at 2599-2601.
133. The psychiatrist had been specifically assigned by the state to the Alameda jail.
After the KQED telecast, he had been discharged. 98 S. Ct. at 2599 n.2. (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing).
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branches of the NAACP filed a civil rights action 3' against the
sheriff in which they asserted that he had violated their first and
fourteenth amendment rights by prohibiting access to the jail.
About three weeks after the complaint was filed, the sheriff did
announce a new policy of regular tours on a first-come, first-served
basis for groups of no more than twenty-five persons. Major areas
of the jail were, however, kept "off-limits" and visitors were not
allowed to take cameras or tape recorders or to interview inmates.
Several reporters, including one from KQED, went along on the first
tour.
Despite the new policy, the case proceeded to a hearing on
KQED's request for preliminary injunctive relief. KQED argued
that the sheriff's limitations made the program inadequate. The
sheriff justified the limitations on the basis of security and manage-
ment concerns, and he pointed out that there were liberal mail,
telephone, and visitation privileges whereby inmates could commu-
nicate with those on the outside. The district court essentially
agreed with the KQED arguments and issued a preliminary injunc-
tion which gave KQED the right to go into all parts of the jail, to
use photographic and sound equipment, and to interview inmates
"at reasonable times and hours."' The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the trial court's order and concluded that
both the press and public have a constitutional right of access to
jails. '3 Justice Rehnquist then stayed the application of the order; 37
the Supreme Court granted certiorari'3 and reversed.
Most first amendment cases have centered on the dissemination
of information rather than the receipt or acquisition of it. Only in
the most limited circumstances may the government prevent a
speech for a publication before it occurs. 39 The manner, place, and
method of disseminating information may be regulated, but only in
ways calculated not to lessen or to limit the speaker or writer's basic
ability to communicate nor to deter him from doing so."10 Some
speech may give rise to after-the-fact sanctions, but even then there
134. The action was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
135. 98 S. Ct. at 2593.
136. KQED, Inc. v. Houchins, 546 F.2d 284 (9th Cir. 1976).
137. 429 U.S. 1341 (1977).
138. 431 U.S. 928 (1977).
139. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Near v. Minn.,
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
140. See generally Cox v. Louisiana (Cox II), 379 U.S. 559 (1965); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336
U.S. 77 (1949); Saia v. N.Y., 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.
I11. 1978).
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are strict limitations on the scope of such sanctions.' Dissemina-
tion is generally protected even when the methods of acquiring the
information have been questionable or even illegal.'
Logically, however, acquisition should go with dissemination. In
most instances acquisition proceeds through traditional means of
inquiry and investigation. The question posed by Houchins was
whether the ability to gain access to information is entitled to the
same kind of protection as the dissemination of information once it
has been acquired. The answer was no.4 3 This decision marked the
end of what might have been called a slight drift in the direction of
developing a first amendment right of access to information, and
created something of a logical conundrum.
There has been a concern expressed by the Court over a number
of years about obstacles placed in the way of news collection and
dissemination. A discriminatory tax aimed at newspapers was, for
example, considered to be an unconstitutional burden on freedom
of the press.' Similarly, the Court was concerned in Cox Broadcast-
ing Corp. v. Cohn' that punishing a reporter and a television sta-
tion for reporting information that was already a part of the public
record might chill the free collection and dissemination of news. But
none of these collection/dissemination cases focused directly on the
question of access.
The closest the Court came to fashioning some constitutional
framework for a right of access was inthe commercial speech cases.
In Bigelow v. Virginia'46 and, more clearly, in Virginia State Board
141. The defamation and obscenity cases are instructive. See, e.g., Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Miller v. Cal., 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
142. See, e.g., Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Va., 434 U.S. 887 (1978); Oklahoma
Pub. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713; Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d
701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
143. There was also posed the additional question whether the press has a greater claim
to a right of access in certain circumstances than does the general public. The answer to that
question was unclear but it tended toward the affirmative. Justice Stewart explicitly stated
that the press is entitled to special accommodations, 98 S. Ct. at 2598. The dissenters did
not directly address this question separate from the general issue of access, but one would
presume them to be more sympathetic to the press argument than the plurality. This is a
complex and interesting issue. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795-
802 (Burger, C.J., concurring); Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REv. 731
(1977); Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
144. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
145. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). Actually, the decision was consistent with an old common law
privilege for the accurate reporting of matters on the public record.
146. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
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of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,'47 the
United State Supreme Court reversed its decision in the 1942 case
of Valentine v. Chrestensen, that commercial speech was bereft of
first amendment protection. In so doing, the Court focused on the
public's general right to know the kind of information provided
through advertisements (usually price) so that economically ra-
tional decisions could be made. Similar considerations were present
in Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 4 where the
Court invalidated an ordinance which absolutely prohibited the
posting of any "For Sale" or "Sold" signs on individual residences
and in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 110 the lawyer advertising case.
Indeed, the issue could hardly be avoided in the principal case in
the series, the one involving Virginia pharmacists, because the
plaintiffs were consumers who claimed that their "right to know"
important information was unconstitutionally restricted by a Vir-
ginia law which forbade advertisements for prescription drugs.
If there is some right to receive as well as to disseminate informa-
tion which is within the scope of first amendment protection, then
shouldn't the public, including the press, generally have access to
information so that citizens may learn as well as speak? Acquisition
of information does imply some sort of action beyond the passive
receipt of facts, and a very real distinction must be drawn between
the public and private sectors. The state may prevent or punish
speech or publication only in limited numbers of situations. Like-
wise, the state may only compel speech or disclosures by private
citizens in certain specified circumstances. There are obvious excep-
tions. Radio and television are highly regulated. 5' Various state and
147. 425 U.S. 748 (1976). Although Valentine v. Chrestensen, infra note 148, was, for all
intents and purposes overruled, the commercial/noncommercial dichotomy continues to be
very much alive in determining the scope of permissible regulation of advertising. In the
pharmacists' case the Court specifically noted that commerical speech could still be regulated
as to truth and legitimacy. For more on this point see Hunter, Prescription Drugs and Open
Housing: More on Commercial Speech, 25 EMoRY L.J. 815 (1976).
148. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
149. 341 U.S. 85 (1977).
150. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The Court, in the next term, refused to carry Bates further and
allow actual solicitation. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). But cf.
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
151. For an argument in favor of treating the printed media somewhat similarly see
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HAv. L. REv. 1641 (1967);
see also Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass Media: A
Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (1973). The issue seems moot for the
moment. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Supreme Court
made it clear that a state may not require a newspaper to publish something which its editors
do not want to publish.
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federal statutes require disclosures to be made in connection with
sales of securities, loans, car sales, food sales and any number of
other transactions. These are all justified as means for the equaliza-
tion of bargaining power, the avoidance of fraud or the protection
of health. Despite the increase in regulatory requirements which
now affect many, if not most business transactions, there is still
little that the state or a private citizen can do to compel speech.
Pharmacists and lawyers may now be free to advertise, but they do
not have to do so. The Nazi Party won a legal battle to be allowed
to stage a rally in Skokie, Illinois, 52 but then decided to march in
Chicago. Thus, the constitutional right to receive depends not only
on the protection of the constitutional right to speak or to publish,
but also on the willingness of private citizens to do so. 113
Is, or should, the state be treated differently? Theoretically, what
is possessed by the state, including bits of information, is collec-
tively possessed by all of us and should, therefore, be publicly avail-
able. But there is hardly a soul who would disagree with the proposi-
tion that some information in the possession of the state should not
be made public. Military secrets are classic examples. Their disclo-
sure might result directly in loss of life, and might directly or indi-
rectly threaten general national security. If the state has sound
arguments for keeping secret some kinds of information, then does
that mean that there is no constitutional basis for seeking to gain
access and that the state may constitutionally choose not to disclose
anything? The FOIA was enacted in large part because the execu-
tive branch was acting largely under a veil of secrecy.'5 Absent
such a statute, as limited as it may be, the government could adopt
a general policy of nondisclosure and nonaccess unless there were a
countervailing constitutional balance. There are limits on what data
the government may collect and how the government may collect
152. See Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978).
For the earlier case history, see National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432
U.S. 43 (1976), on remand, 51111. App. 3d 279, 366 N.E. 2d 347 (1977), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 69 11. 2d 605, 373 N.E.2d 21 (1978); National Socialist Party of America v. Village of
Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (1977)(denying petitioners' application for stay of injunction pending
review by the Illinois Supreme Court).
153. Being quiet can certainly be an effective means of expression. Furthermore, it can
be argued that the First Amendment protects not merely speech but also individual auton-
omy as it is manifested through forms of expression, whatever they may be. For the relation-
ship of privacy as a concept to First Amendment theory and the idea of autonomy, see, e.g.,
Howard, The Supreme Court and Modern Lifestyles, 2 WILSON Q. 55 (1978); Greenawalt,
Personal Privacy and the Law, 2 WILSON Q. 67; Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUS.
L. REv. 1410 (1974); Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462 (1973).
154. See notes 4-8 & accompanying text supra.
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data,'55 but if there is no constitutional basis for seeking access, then
the degree of access allowed is entirely at the discretion of the gov-
ernment.
In Houchins it was clear that at least three, and perhaps four
Justices were unwilling to read into the first amendment a right of
access to information in the hands of the government. Chief Justice
Burger, in his opinion for the plurality of three, concluded that: (1)
none of the Court's prior cases had "intimated a First Amendment
guarantee of a right of access,"''5 and (2) that there was no practical
way to define such a right.
There is no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to disclose, or for
standards governing disclosure of or access to information. Because the
Constitution affords no guidelines, absent statutory standards, hundreds
of judges would, under the Court of Appeals' approach, be at large to
fashion ad hoc standards, in individual cases, according to their own ideas
of what seems "desirable" or "expedient." We, therefore, reject the Court
of Appeals' conclusory assertion that the public and the media have a
First Amendment right to government information regarding the condi-
tions of jails and their inmates and presumably all other public facilities
such as hospitals and mental institutions."7
The Chief Justice believed that the task of deciding what, when and
how to disclose should be left to the legislature. The plurality also
concluded that the press had no greater claim to access than the
public generally.
Justice Stewart concurred in most of the plurality opinion, espe-
cially with respect to the conclusion that there is no constitutional
right of access to information held by the government.' Ss His one
disagreement was with the treatment to be accorded the press-as
opposed to the public generally-once the initial decision as to ac-
cess has been made. He argued that a reporter's role as a surrogate
155. The fourth amendment's protection against unreasonable searches does prevent the
government from engaging in some kinds of information gathering activities, but even that
Amendment does not prevent the search of the home of an innocent person if the government
has cause to believe that evidence relating to a crime may be present. See Zurcher v. Stanford
Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
156. 98 S. Ct. at 2594.
157. Id. at 2597. Despite the concern expressed by the Chief Justice, courts make ad hoc
decisions every day with only the most minimal constitutional or statutory guidelines. The
pornography and privacy cases are instructive.
158. The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right
of access to information generated or controlled by government, nor do they guaran-
tee the press any basic right of access superior to that of the public generally. The
Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press equal access once
government has opened its doors.
98 S. Ct. at 2598 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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sometimes requires that he be afforded preferential treatment. Jus-
tice Stewart summarized saying, "[i]n short, terms of access that
are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may,
if they impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be
unreasonable as applied to journalists who are there to convey to the
general public what the visitors see."' 9
Justice Stevens, who wrote the dissenting opinion in which Jus-
tices Brennan and Powell joined, reached almost precisely the op-
posite conclusion from that of the Chief Justice. Proceeding from
the general premise that a central purpose of the first amendment
is to protect the "free flow of information" and that this necessitates
receipt as well as dissemination, Justice Stevens argued there must
be some constitutional limitations on government's power to re-
strain the flow of information at its source. Justice Stevens rea-
soned:
It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channels of communication be free
of governmental restraints. Without some protection for the acquisition of
information about the operation of public institutions such as prisons by
the public at large, the process of self-governance comtemplated by the
Framers would be stripped of its substance.6 0
The dissenters were willing to countenance significant limitations
on required disclosure. They believed, however, that the fundamen-
tal question of access should not be left solely in the hands of the
government, especially when the issue involved a matter of signifi-
cant societal interest and responsibility, such as prison conditions.',
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2606 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Justice Stevens argued that:
The reasons which militate in favor of providing special protection to the flow of
information to the public about prisons relate to the unique function they perform
in a democratic society. Not only are they public institutions, financed with public
funds and administered by public servants; they are an integral component of the
criminal justice system. The citizens confined therein are temporarily, and some-
times permanently, deprived of their liberty as a result of a trial which must
conform to the dictates of the Constitution. By express comments of the Sixth
Amendment the proceeding must be a "public trial." It is important not only that
the trial itself be fair, but also that the community at large have confidence in the
integrity of the proceeding. That public interest survives the judgment of conviction
and appropriately carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is treated
during his period of punishment and hoped-for rehabilitation. While a ward of the
State and subject to its stern discipline, he retains constitutional protections
against cruel and unusual punishment, ... a protection which may derive more
practical support from access to information about prisons by the public than by
occasional litigation in a busy court.
98 S. Ct. at 2608 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Since Justice Marshall and Blackmun did not participate in the
case, ' 2 one can only speculate as to the result were a similar case
to be decided by the entire Court. For the time being, however, the
FOIA and the Privacy Act stand as the principal standards by which
government disclosure at the federal level is to be judged. State
governments continue to be subject to their varied "sunshine" and
"open meetings and records" laws. The first and fourteenth amend-
ments, at least according to Houchins, do not stand in the way of
total secrecy on the part of the government.
What is interesting about the decision is that it need not have
been so sweeping. All the members of the Court seemed to accept
two premises: (1) there is a legitimate public interest in prison con-
ditions; and (2) the sheriff or warden has a responsibility to insure
safety and order in the prison and to do so necessitates some limita-
tions on access to the facility by outsiders. The majority also ac-
cepted the premise that prisoners could not be prohibited from com-
municating with persons on the outside and that the press was free
to investigate as best it could and report on conditions at the jail.
Petitioner cannot prevent respondents from learning about jail conditions
in a variety of ways, albeit not as conveniently as they might prefer.
Respondents have a First Amendment right to receive letters from in-
mates criticizing jail officials and reporting on conditions .... Respon-
dents are free to interview those who render the legal assistance to which
inmates are entitled .... They are also free to seek out former inmates,
visitors to the prison, public officials, and institutional personnel, as they
sought out the complaining psychiatrist here.1 3
The only real question that had to be decided on appeal was
whether the district court had abused its discretion in ordering the
sheriff to allow greater rights of access to the press than to the public
generally and to permit cameras and recording devices to be brought
into the prison. The majority could have reversed the trial court
without reaching the constitutional issue of access. For one thing,
the sheriff had already adopted a plan that did permit some visita-
tion. KQED obviously wanted a decision that required access for
fear that the sheriff might close the jail again and precipitate an-
other round of litigation. Nonetheless, it was simply not necessary
for the Court to decide the basic constitutional issue. There was
ample. precedent in the Court's 1974 decisions in Pell v. Procunier"'
162. Id. at 2597.
163. Id.
164. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
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and Saxbe v. Washington Post Co. 6 to support the proposition that
newsmen were not entitled to any greater access to prisons than
what was afforded to the general public. 6 ' But, for reasons which
are not altogether clear, the Court undertook to issue a decision on
the question of access itself, a decision which severely limited the
possibility of seeking government information other than informally
or through statutorily mandated procedures.
The Court now has pending the interesting case of Gannett Co.
v. DePasquale'67 which provides the opportunity for at least a partial
reappraisal of the Houchins decision. In a murder case the trial
judge issued an order excluding the press and public from a pre-trial
suppression hearing. This order was appealed by a company en-
gaged in both print and electronic journalism and the appellate
division reversed because the trial judge had not made any findings
about the likelihood of prejudicial publicity nor had he considered
alternative methods for protecting the defendants' sixth amend-
ment rights. By the time the case reached the court of appeals, the
two defendants had pleaded guilty to lesser included offenses and
the problem was moot, but the Court went ahead and issued an
opinion largely as guidance for future cases. The court of appeals
modified the appellate division's reversal by saying that whatever
legitimate public interest there might be in the suppression hearing
could be satisfied by providing the press with transcripts of the
hearing from which matters deemed to be inadmissible had been
removed. This result was fairly typical of the kinds of compromises
regularly reached in cases presenting conflicts between first and
sixth amendment rights."8
The Gannett case may not change the Houchins holding at all. It
involves the continuing problem of protecting the due process rights
of criminal defendants and avoiding any unnecessary restraints on
165. 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
166. Actually, if the Court had focused primarily on the point of press as opposed to public
access, the result might have been different. Given the fact of access, the three dissenters,
plus Justice Stewart, agreed, in general, that the specific needs and responsibilities of the
press might necessitate some differences in treatment between reporters and members of the
general public. Thus, if the question of access had been treated as essentially moot on the
facts, the preliminary injunction might have been partially upheld so as to recognize KQED's
particular responsibilities as a news gatherer and disseminator.
167. 55 App. Div. 2d 107, 389 N.Y.S.2d 719 (1976), modified, 43 N.Y.2d 370, 372 N.E.2d
544, 401 N.Y.S.2d 756 (1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 2975 (1978).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Cianfrani, 573 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1978); Brian W. v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 618, 574 P.2d 788, 143 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1978); Gannett Pacific v.
Richardson, - Haw. __, 580 P.2d 49 (1978); State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132, 373 A.2d 377
(1977).
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public access to and press coverage of criminal trials. Moreover, the
access question is altogether different from what it was in Houchins.
The sixth amendment grants the accused the right to a "public
trial." If he does not want to be tried in private, the judge can do
nothing about it. The Gannett case may, however, clarify the
Court's understanding of the word "trial" as used in the sixth
amendment. Does it refer only to the trial or to the entire process
from arrest forward, or to some parts and not others? At common
law there has long been recognized a privilege of access to judicial
proceedings and fair comment thereon. This privilege was very
much a factor in Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.,'" (the
Nixon "tapes" case) and in Cohn v. Cox Broadcasting Co.,'7" (the
case involving the publication of a rape victim's name). There is no
such privilege of access to prisons or to government information
generally. Nevertheless, the indecisiveness evidenced by the splits
in Houchins does suggest that there may be a review of its rationale
forthcoming in the not too distant future.
CONCLUSION
With the decision in Houchins v. KQED, Inc., it is apparent that
the doors to government deliberations and government data will not
be easily unlocked, if at all, through constitutional arguments. In-
stead, a person who seeks to learn what the government is doing or
what it knows about him or who wants to be sure the government
does not misuse some private information will have to depend on
statutes such as the FOIA and the Privacy Act. As praiseworthy as
these statutes may be in their stated policies, they have certainly
not proven to be especially useful. Their utility has been further
underminded by judicial decisions which have narrowly applied the
Acts and which have created large loopholes. Coupled with the pre-
dictable inertia of any bureaucracy, these decisions have gone a long
way to stymie the effectiveness of the FOIA. It is still a bit too early
to predict the future of the Privacy Act, but its inherent ambiguities
and complexities do not bode well for a sensible and coherent appli-
cation.
169. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
170. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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